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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN "FAIR HOUSING" AND FREE
SPEECH
Under the Fair Housing Act and its 1988 amendments, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development has the power to investigate alleged discrimina-
tion in public housing. The targets of these investigations are often neighborhood
organizations and community groups voicing their opposition to the placement of
public housing in their neighborhoods. The alleged discrimination can be nothing
more than group meetings and the petitioning of local government officials. Mind-
ful that such investigations have sometimes adversely affected the exercise of First
Amendment rights, in 1994 HUD issued guidelines for handling fair housing com-
plaints when such rights are at issue.
This Note will first explain the goals of the Fair Housing Act and its 1988
amendments, and then will survey some of the representative investigations under-
taken by HUD. This Note then will analyze the constitutionality and effectiveness
of HUD's new guidelines. Concluding that there remains a potential chilling effect
on the housing opponents' First Amendments rights, this Note proposes recommen-
dations for investigations that would safeguard those rights, yet still promote fair
housing goals.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you own a home in a quiet, residential area. One day a
neighbor tells you that the local fair housing advocacy group is planning to
establish a group home for recovering substance abusers on your street. You
are understandably concerned about who is going to be living in the home,
what kind of supervision the residents will have, and whether such a home
is likely to bring crime into your peaceful neighborhood. You also may be
motivated by more selfish reasons, such as preserving property values and
the family character of the community. You and other concerned citizens
meet in your home to discuss the group home and the impact its arrival may
have on your neighborhood. You put up signs around the community that
alert people to what is being proposed and suggest that they make their
opinions heard. You may even collect signatures to protest the placement of
the home.
As a result of these activities, imagine further that you are notified that
you are under investigation by the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) for suspected violations of the federal Fair
Housing Act.' Although no formal charges are filed, investigators demand
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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that you turn over copies of your letters, diaries, and meeting notes, as well
as the names of your supporters. You are threatened with $50,000 in fines.
The investigation drags on for months. Unbelievable? This scenario is being
played out across the country, as federal government inquiries deter citizens
from speaking out in opposition to public housing projects.
The clash between proponents of non-discriminatory housing and free
speech advocates is startling at first glance. Both groups traditionally have
aligned themselves with the fight for individual freedoms. Although the goal
of eliminating discriminatory practices in public housing is legitimate and
worthy, fair housing advocates have gone too far. HUD, in attempting to
protect the rights of individuals under the Fair Housing Act, has interfered
with the First Amendment rights of individuals and community groups by
inhibiting their right to freedom of speech and assembly, as well as their
right to petition the government. Across the United States, citizens have
chosen to protest the placement of group homes in their neighborhood
through activities such as neighborhood meetings, petitions, and flyers. HUD
has responded to many of these activities with intrusive investigations that
virtually force the protestors into silence. After significant public outcry
about possible free speech violations, HUD issued guidelines for the man-
agement of fair housing investigations.' Although purporting to remedy the
unconstitutional nature of HUD's inquiries, the guidelines are inadequate.
Despite their curative efforts, HUD continues to "chill" individuals' First
Amendment rights.
This Note will argue that although HUD is operating under new guide-
lines, it continues to violate individuals' free speech rights. Part I will exam-
ine the goals that HUD seeks to further through the Fair Housing Act, its
1988 Amendments, and the enforcement mechanisms contained therein. It
will then survey some of HUD's recent newsworthy investigations that dem-
onstrate the intrusiveness of HUD's fair housing policy with respect to free
speech rights. Part II will explore the constitutionality and effectiveness of
HUD's guidelines that purport to limit First Amendment violations that may
result from the investigation of Fair Housing Act complaints. In conclusion,
this Note will propose recommendations to bring fair housing investigations
into compliance with the First Amendment's strictures, while still promoting
HUD's fair housing goals.
' Memorandum from Roberta Achtenberg, Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and
Equal Opportunity, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, to Fair Hous-
ing and Equal Opportunity Office Directors, Enforcement Directors, Compliance Direc-
tors, Staff, and Office of Investigations (Sept. 2, 1994) [hereinafter HUD Memorandum]
(on file with author).
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I. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
A. The Fair Housing Act and the 1988 Amendments
The Fair Housing Act (the Act) prohibits discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
and national origin.3 Congress enacted the Act to ensure "'the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers ... when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification."' 4 Courts have determined that Congress has the power to
prohibit housing discrimination based on race pursuant to the Thirteenth
Amendment.5
The Act applies to dwellings owned or operated by the federal govern-
ment, or obtained or supported using federal funds;6 the Act does not regu-
late private sales between individuals acting outside the established profes-
sional real estate market.' Under the Act, it is unlawful to "discriminate in
the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny," residential
property to protected persons! In addition, a governmental agency must
"make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services"
when necessary to give such persons equal opportunity for housing.9 The
Act also expressly prohibits acts that "coerce, intimidate, threaten, or inter-
fere with any person" exercising their housing rights or with any others who
have aided or encouraged the exercise of those rights.' For purposes of the
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
4 United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974) (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (discussing Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act)), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
' The Thirteenth Amendment, ratified in 1865, reads:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
The Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
that Congress has the power to regulate racial discrimination in housing under the Thir-
teenth Amendment, as it falls under the rubric of "badges and incidents of slavery." Id.
at 438-41.
6 42 U.S.C. § 3603(a).
Michigan Protection & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695, 709
(E.D. Mich. 1992), affid, 18 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1994).
8 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1).
9 Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B).
10 Id. § 3617.
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Act, courts have determined that "intentional discrimination can include ac-
tions motivated by stereotypes, unfounded fears, misperceptions, and 'archa-
ic attitudes', as well as simple prejudice about people with disabilities.""
Under the 1968 law, HUD was given little enforcement power to further
the goals of the Act. HUD was authorized only to initiate investigations and
to seek conciliation regarding complaints of housing discrimination.12 The
average complaint could be resolved only by voluntary resolution between
the parties. 13 Furthermore, if the parties failed to come to an agreement,
HUD could only inform the complainant of the right to sue in court.1
4
Twenty years later, Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988 (the FHAA). 5 The primary purpose of the FHAA was to provide
an effective administrative enforcement system to fulfill the goals of Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1968 and 1974, which prohibit housing
practices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, reli-
gion, or sex. 16 Congress noted the continuing pervasiveness of discrimina-
tory practices in public housing and cited a HUD estimate that two million
instances of housing discrimination occur each year in the United States. 7
Congress also recognized that the original Act lacked effective enforcement
mechanisms, 8 and created in the FHAA greater enforcement responsibili-
ties at both HUD and the Department of Justice.' 9
The FHAA also extended the original Act's protection to handicapped
persons.2' "Handicap" is described as including impairments which sub-
" Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1575-76 (E.D. Mo.
1994).
1 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (Supp. IV 1965-1968) (amended 1988); see also Joseph D.
Rich, Enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, as Amended, by the Department of Justice,
46 Bus. LAW. 1335, 1335 (1991).
" James A. Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Gen-
eration of Fair Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049, 1088 (1989).
14 Id.
15 Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 & 42 U.S.C.).
16 See H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2176-78 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 711]; Kushner, supra note 13,
at 1087-88. For a description of the administrative system, see id. at 1088-90.
17 H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 16, at 15, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173,
2176.
18 Id. at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177.
19 Rich, supra note 12, at 1335-36.
20 Under the Amendments,
"Handicap" means, with respect to a person-
(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities,
(2) a record of having such an impairment, or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment,
1226 [Vol. 4:3
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stantially limit one's major life activities,2 and Congress intentionally left
this definition open to permit a flexible interpretation.22 Courts have con-
strued the term broadly-alcoholics and drug addicts who are not currently
using drugs or alcohol are "handicapped" within the meaning of the Fair
Housing Act,' as are the mentally ill,' and persons infected with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS).' The legislative history of the Act reveals that Congress was con-
but such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled
substance ....
42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1988).
The extension of the Fair Housing Act's protection to handicapped persons has
been justified under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. See Pulcinella v. Ridley
Township, 822 F. Supp. 204, 211 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding the FHAA constitutional on
its face as a lawful exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power).
21 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).
22 See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 16, at 22, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2183.
The definition of handicap does not include a list of specific diseases and condi-
tions that constitute physical or mental impairments because of the difficulty of
ensuring the comprehensiveness of any such list and because some conditions
covered under the definition of handicap may not even have been discovered or
prevalent in the population at the time of passage of legislation.
Id. at 22 n.55, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183 n.55.
' See Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 459
(D.N.J. 1992) (holding alcoholism and drug addiction as impairments under the Fair
Housing Act); see also United States v. Southern Mgmt. Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 920-22
(4th Cir. 1992) (stating that despite the Fair Housing Act's specific exclusion of persons
"addict[ed] to a controlled substance" from the definition of a "handicap," persons who
have a history of drug use or addiction but who do not currently use illegal drugs may
fall under the definition of "handicapped" and be protected); United States v. Borough
of Audubon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 358-59 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that occupants of a resi-
dential group home for recovering substance abusers were "handicapped" within the
meaning of the provisions of the Fair Housing Act), aff'd per curiam, 968 F.2d 14 (3d
Cir. 1992).
' See Easter Seal Soc'y of N.J., Inc. v. Township of North Bergen, 798 F. Supp.
228, 233 (D.N.J. 1992) (holding that former chemical abusers with other mental im-
pairments have standing to sue under FHA's provision prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of handicap); Deep East Tex. Regional Mental Health & Mental Retardation
Servs. v. Kinnear, 877 S.W.2d 550, 558 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (finding Fair Housing Act
and Americans With Disabilities Act applicable in action by neighboring property own-
er to enjoin construction of proposed community home for mentally impaired individu-
als).
' See Support Ministries for Persons With AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 808
F. Supp. 120, 129-32 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that residents of proposed AIDS facility
were handicapped within the meaning of the Fair Housing Act); see also School Bd. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 286 (1987) (noting that "the fact that a person with a record of a
physical impairment is also contagious does not suffice to remove that person from
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cerned that former substance abusers irrationally would be deprived of hous-
ing on the basis of status.26 The House Report on the FHAA states:
The Fair Housing Amendments Act ... is a clear pro-
nouncement of a national commitment to end the unneces-
sary exclusion of persons with handicaps from the American
mainstream. It repudiates the use of stereotypes and igno-
rance, and mandates that persons with handicaps be consid-
ered as individuals. Generalized perceptions about disabilities
and unfounded speculations about threats to safety are spe-
cifically rejected as grounds to justify exclusion.27
HUD is responsible for enforcing the Act.' In addition to expanding
the types of discrimination outlawed by the statute, the FHAA extended
HUD's enforcement responsibilities considerably. Complaints may be filed
under the Act with the Secretary of HUD by any person who claims to have
been injured by a discriminatory housing practice.29 Additionally, the Sec-
retary may file a complaint on his or her own initiative,' a provision
which represents a substantial expansion of HUD's power. The complaints
are to be filed within one year of the alleged incident.3' Complaints that
come from a state or locality with a fair housing law that is "substantially
equivalent" to the FHAA must be referred to the state or local agency.32
Before enacting the FHAA, Congress anticipated that HUD would inves-
tigate fair housing claims and use "'informal methods of conference, concili-
coverage"); Hogar Agua y Vida en el Desierto v. Suarez, 829 F. Supp. 19, 20 n.1
(D.P.R. 1993) (stating that persons infected with HIV and with AIDS are "handicapped"
under the Fair Housing Act), vacated on other grounds, 36 F.3d 177 (1st Cir. 1994).
2 H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 16, at 22, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183
(arguing that "former drug-dependent persons do not pose a threat to a dwelling or its
inhabitants simply on the basis of status. Depriving such individuals of housing, or
evicting them, would constitute irrational discrimination that may seriously jeopardize
their continued recovery.").
27 Id. at 18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179.
HUD interpreted the FHAA's protections to handicapped persons "in the same
manner as the protections provided to others under the Fair Housing Act." 54 Fed. Reg.
3231, 3236 (1989). H.R. 711 further states that "[a]ll of these groups have experienced
discrimination because of prejudice and aversion--because they make non-handicapped
people uncomfortable. [The FHAA] clearly prohibits the use of stereotypes and preju-
dice to deny critically needed housing to handicapped persons." H.R. REP. No. 711,
supra note 16, at 18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179.
2 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (1988).
29 Id. § 3610(a)(1)(A)(i).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. § 3610(0.
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ation, and persuasion' in an attempt to resolve them."33 HUD is required,
after completion of its investigation of a discriminatory housing practice
complaint, to determine if reasonable cause exists to believe that such a
discriminatory housing practice has occurred.' If HUD determines that
reasonable cause exists to believe discriminatory housing practices are tak-
ing place, it is authorized to bring charges before an administrative law
judge.35 The Act provides that HUD's enforcement investigations are not to
exceed 100 days, "unless it is impracticable to do so."'
If the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination, the same burden
of proof test that is applied by the federal courts to employment discrimina-
tion cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is to be applied to
housing discrimination cases brought before an administrative law judge.37
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation by a preponderance of the evidence.38 This may be done by proving
a fact that gives rise to an inference of discrimination.39 The burden then
shifts, to the defendant to assert some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its action.40 Finally, the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the defendant are
pretextual.41 Where the government can produce direct evidence of discrim-
33 H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 16, at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1982)).
34 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(1).
31 Id. §§ 3610(g)(2), 3612. Alternatively, an aggrieved party may elect to have the
case decided in a federal district court. Id. § 3612(a), (o). This election procedure was
created to protect the parties' constitutional right to a jury trial. See ROBERT G.
SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 24.8(1) (1995) (discuss-
ing the election process).
36 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv). "Upon the filing of such a complaint ... the Sec-
retary shall make an investigation of the alleged discriminatory housing practice and
complete such investigation within 100 days after the filing of the complaint ... unless
it is impracticable to do so." Id.
31 See, e.g., Pollitt v. Bramel, 669 F. Supp. 172, 175 (S.D. Ohio 1987); see also
ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 323-25, 404-16 (1983).
31 Pollitt, 669 F. Supp. at 175 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973)).
39 The McDonnell Douglas opinion provides an example of a prima facie case in the
employment discrimination context. The plaintiff must show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The Court noted that the facts will vary and the specification
of proof required is not necessarily applicable to all cases. Id. at 802 n.13.
Pollitt, 669 F. Supp. at 175 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804).
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ination, the shifting burdens of proof analysis need not be applied, and the
burden remains with the plaintiff.
42
When an administrative law judge finds that a respondent has engaged
in discriminatory practices, the judge shall issue an order "for such relief as
may be appropriate, which may include actual damages suffered by the
aggrieved person and injunctive or equitable relief., 43 A civil penalty also
may be assessed against the respondent "to vindicate the public interest."'
If the respondent has been adjudged to have committed any prior discrimi-
natory practices, the maximum civil penalty is $25,000; if not, the penalty
cannot exceed $10,000. 41 If the Secretary claims that the complainant suf-
fered embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress as a result of the
respondent's actions, a complainant is entitled to recover for these categories
of damages in addition to actual damages. 6 Because these intangible inju-
ries are difficult, if not impossible, to measure, courts have ruled that pre-
cise proof of the actual dollar value of the injury is not required.47 The ad-
ministrative law judge is accorded wide discretion in setting damages for
emotional distress.
48
The Act and its amendments create a legal framework for HUD to work
within. Problems, however, have resulted from HUD administrators' broad
interpretation of their investigatory and enforcement powers, at the expense
of the rights of those investigated.
42 Marilyn Frisbie, HUDAU 07-91-0027-1, 1992 WL 406521, at *4 (H.U.D.A.L.J.
May 6, 1992).
43 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3) (1988).
"Id.
41 Id.; see also 24 C.F.R. § 104.910(b)(3) (1995).
46 See, e.g., Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F. Supp. 876, 879 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (affirming
$20,000 damage award under the Fair Housing Act in light of the jury's findings that
defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively); Gordon G. Blackwell,
HUDALJ 04-89-0520-1, 1989 WL 386958, at *16-18 (H.U.D.A.L.J. Dec. 21, 1989)
(awarding $40,000 and $20,000 to the complainants and intervenors, respectively, for
the "embarrassment, humiliation and emotional distress" they suffered at the hands of
the respondent).
4' Block v. R.H. Macy & Co., 712 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that the
evidence of racial discrimination in a Title VII employment case was sufficient to sus-
tain an award for over $12,000 for "mental anguish, humiliation, embarrassment, and
stress"); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 383-84 (10th Cir. 1973) (upholding
$1000 in compensatory damages, including telephone expenses, moving and storage
expenses, and compensation for emotional distress and humiliation).
48 SCHWEMM, supra note 37, at 260-62.
1230 [Vol. 4:3
"FAIR HOUSING" AND FREE SPEECH
B. Recent Newsworthy Investigations by HUD
1. Investigations Concluded Without Judicial Adjudication
HUD has conducted numerous investigations of organized opposition to
group social service homes under the Fair Housing Act and its 1988
Amendments. Protests against federally supported projects such as homeless
shelters, AIDS hospices, and rehabilitative halfway houses have been exam-
ined as potential housing discrimination against the handicapped. Although
HUD's investigatory powers are provided by statute,49 the extent of their
inquiries into neighborhood citizen protests has far exceeded the confines of
the statute, to the detriment of the protestors' First Amendment rights.
In Seattle, Washington, a local homeowners' group attempted to petition
the government concerning their neighborhood development. In 1992, the
homeowners sued the city for approving the construction of five group
homes for recovering drug addicts and the mentally ill within a single city
block.5° Such construction was in violation of the city's prohibition of so-
cial service facilities within a quarter-mile of each other.5 The homeown-
ers claimed to be worried about their safety and property values.52 The
owner of the halfway house complained to HUD, prompting HUD to inves-
tigate the homeowners to determine if they had unlawfully interfered with
fair housing rights of recovering substance abusers by committing an act of
discrimination. 3 The homeowners argued that the investigation was an at-
tempt by HUD to inhibit them from speaking out against the project.54
Similarly, a Richmond, Virginia neighborhood association was investi-
gated for exercising their rights of free speech, assembly, and petitioning the
government. In November 1993, the association tried to enjoin construction
of two medical hospices for AIDS victims that was being funded by a $2
million grant from HUD, claiming the hospices violated local zoning ordi-
nances.55 The association's activities included neighborhood meetings, cir-
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 3611 (1988). HUD has 100 days to investigate a complaint. See
supra note 36 and accompanying text. In addition, HUD is authorized to issue subpoe-
nas, pay witness fees, and fine or imprison witnesses for failing to appear or altering
evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 3611.
' Heather Mac Donald, HUD Continues Its Assault on Free Speech, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 14, 1994, at A19.
sId.
2 Steven Goldsmith, A Hostel Welcome, and a Hostile One, SEATrLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 17, 1992, at Al, A7.
13 Id. at A7.
S Id.
' Mac Donald, supra note 50, at A19.
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culating letters in the community, petitioning elected representatives, and
filing a lawsuit.56 The local ACLU, acting on behalf of the Richmond
AIDS Ministry, filed a discrimination complaint, prompting Virginia's Of-
fice of Fair Housing to question the leaders of the neighborhood associa-
tion.57 The government agency asked the citizens to turn over documents
relating to the protest activities.5" The investigation was dropped after elev-
en months when Virginia's Attorney General James S. Gilmore III advised
that "[t]he activities of the defendants ... manifestly implicate[d] values
protected by the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution."5
HUD's most publicized investigation took place after citizens engaged in
comparable protest activities in Berkeley, California. In 1993, a private fair
housing group called Housing Rights, Inc. submitted a complaint to HUD
alleging that three neighborhood residents had interfered with its proposed
low-income housing project." The group was planning to convert a former
motel into a thirty-five unit home for recovering substance abusers and the
mentally disabled.6' The neighborhood residents' allegedly discriminatory
behavior consisted of remarks the residents made at public meetings, as well
as letters and documents written to oppose the project.62 The neighborhood
residents questioned the proposed housing project because they claimed it
lacked the staff to deal with the number of patients,63 but Housing Rights
contended that the citizens' prejudice against the future residents' handicaps
was the cause of their opposition to the facility.'
In response to the complaint, HUD launched an investigation into the
alleged housing discrimination.6" The neighborhood residents were asked to
submit to HUD all evidence relating to the projects, including membership
lists, literature, posters, newsletters, and the minutes and tapes from any
56 Alan Cooper, Organization Fighting AIDS Homes Wins Round, RICHMOND
TIMES-DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 1994, at B5.
" Id. Complaints that come from a state or locality with a fair housing law that is
"substantially equivalent" to the FHAA must be referred to the state or local agency. 42
U.S.C. § 3610(f) (1988).
58 Mary Ann Wirtz, Speaking Out Brought Intimidation, RICHMOND TIMES-DIS-
PATCH, Aug. 27, 1994, at A10 (letter to the editor written by the president of the neigh-
borhood association).
9 Cooper, supra note 56, at B5.
6 HUD Dismisses Complaint Against Berkeley Project Opponents, 22 Hous. & Dev.
Rep. (BNA) 227, 227 (1994) [hereinafter Berkeley Project Opponents].
61 Id.
62 See Susan Ferriss, Free speech advocates find a fight in Berkeley, S.F. EXAMINER,
July 22, 1994, at A6.
63 Housing Opponents Cleared, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 17, 1994, at A22.
Berkeley Project Opponents, supra note 60, at 227.
65 See Janet Wells, Fair Housing and Free Speech at Issue in Berkeley, S.F.
CHRON., July 22, 1994, at A19, A21.
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public meeting discussing the proposed group home.' Because of their al-
legedly coercive, intimidating, and interfering behavior, the residents were
threatened by HUD with fines of up to $50,000.67 In August 1994, after
disrupting the homeowners' lives with over seven months of extensive scru-
tiny, the Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity found that the
Berkeley residents' actions did not violate the Fair Housing Act.6
The intrusiveness of the Berkeley investigation generated nationwide
publicity. Another incident in nearby North Berkeley clearly illustrates how
the Berkeley investigation, which was still going on at the time, chilled free
speech in that area. In July 1994, a proposal was introduced in North Berke-
ley to create an AIDS housing project.69 Residents were publicly warned
by the city attorney that because of the controversy in Berkeley, certain
types of questions about the proposal could be interpreted as discriminatory
under the Fair Housing Act.7" In a letter to the local paper, the city warned
potential opponents to the project that by speaking out against it, they
opened up themselves and the city to the risk of being sued for discrimina-
tion.7
With all of the publicity in California about HUD's enforcement of the
Fair Housing Act, a more creative claim appeared. In Alameda, California, a
counselor with a housing advocacy group lost her job as a result of munici-
pal funding cuts.72 She filed a complaint with HUD alleging that the City
of Alameda and two top officials "intimidated, interfered or coerced" her in
violation of the Fair Housing Act.73 Threatening to impose fines, HUD in-
vestigated for four months before dismissing the complaint.74 Although a
HUD spokesman said the First Amendment was not implicated,75 those
investigated asserted that "'[ilt's a free speech issue . . . . It's like HUD is
See id. at A21; see also Berkeley Project Opponents, supra note 60, at 228;
Heather Mac Donald, Free Housing Yes, Free Speech No, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1994,
at A12.
67 See, e.g., HUD to Stop Investigating Protests, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 3, 1994, at A3;
Wells, supra note 65, at A19.
68 See Roberta Achtenberg, Sometimes on a Tightrope at HUD, WASH. POST, Aug.
22, 1994, at A17; Housing Opponents Cleared, supra note 63, at A22; Wells, supra
note 65, at A19, A21.
69 Ferriss, supra note 62, at A6.
70 Id. Ferris reports, "[City Attorney Manuela] Albuquerque said she was not at-
tempting to tell citizens that they couldn't speak their minds at public gatherings, but
she did want to inform them that council members had been advised not to engage in
certain types of dialogue." Id.
71 Wells, supra note 65, at A21.
2 Janet Wells, HUD Dismisses Bias Complaint, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 15, 1994, at
A21.
73 Id.
74 Id.
7 Id.
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dictating what cities do when we distribute community development
funds." 76
HUD has also looked into speech that goes beyond government agency
projects, and into market competition. In New York City in June 1994,
HUD investigated a complaint against a community group in Gramercy
Park.' The group, known as the Irving Place Community Coalition, alleg-
edly tried to outbid a developer of housing for the homeless who planned to
establish a 28-unit home for the mentally disabled in the area. 7' The group
distributed petitions and held public meetings to challenge the placement of
the group home.79 The developer involved filed a complaint with HUD,'
who investigated, threatened the community group with fines, and ordered
the group to produce diaries and lists of members and supporters."1 Partici-
pants dropped out of the protest in reaction to HUD's intimidation. 2 The
developer has since dropped its claim against the group. 3
2. Investigations Reaching Court
A few of the HUD Fair Housing investigations that implicate First
Amendment freedoms have reached the court system. The Department of
Justice (DOJ) has pursued civil rights claims against citizen groups who
have sought injunctions against planned housing activities. In 1991, eleven
residents of a Fort Worth, Texas suburb sued to block the placement of a
group home for the mentally retarded in their community.' Within two
weeks, the residents abandoned the lawsuit, after discovering that Texas law
allows group homes in areas zoned as single-family." The group home
opened in late 1991 with six mentally retarded occupants.16 Despite the
successful establishment of the residence, in October 1994 HUD/DOJ filed a
76 Id. (quoting city councilwoman Karin Lucas).
Guy Gugliotta, ACLU Alleges Free Speech Violations in HUD Probes, WASH.
POST, Aug. 17, 1994, at A20.
78 Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Achtenberg's Neighborliness Is Questioned, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 1, 1995, at Al; Andrea Hamilton, Community Organizers Get a Lesson
in Fear from HUD, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 19, 1995, Bulldog ed., at 8A.
'9 Hamilton, supra note 78.
, Gugliotta, supra note 77, at A20.
81 Hamilton, supra note 78.
82 Id.
83 Mac Donald, supra note 50, at A19.
Lou Chapman, Discrimination Suit in Ridgmar Case Set for Trial, FT. WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Dec. 15, 1995, at 33.
85 Brian J. Taylor, No Retreat in Feds' War on Free Speech, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Sept. 10, 1995, at Fl.
86 Id.
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discrimination complaint against the homeowners who protested, claiming
that the homeowners violated the Fair Housing Act. T
On March 12, 1996, a U.S. District Court judge ruled that six of the
residents violated the Fair Housing Act."8 The court found that by suing to
prevent a group home in their neighborhood, the homeowners "sought an
illegal objective under federal law: the exclusion of a group home for men-
tally retarded children from the neighborhood because of the disabilities of
the children." 9 Each resident. faces up to $50,000 in federal fines, plus pu-
nitive damages and attorney fees, which will be determined at a later tri-
al.' Rick Disney, the homeowners' attorney, says they have spent over
$100,000 in legal fees.9'
A similar case was decided recently in favor of protesting homeowners.
In November 1993, neighbors in New Haven, Connecticut sought a court
order to stop a foster parent and her ten disabled children from moving into
their neighborhood, citing local zoning ordinances.' Though the neighbors
claimed First Amendment protection, HUD accused them of discrimination
and DOJ brought a civil rights complaint against them.93 The government
claimed that the act of seeking action in court was a violation of the law
because the citizens were acting with a discriminatory intent.94 The neigh-
bors withdrew their zoning complaint when they learned that DOJ might file
a discrimination complaint against them, and the group home opened.95 The
case, however, proceeded to trial.96 Federal Judge T.F. Gilroy Daly ruled
that the First Amendment rights of the neighbors to petition their govern-
ment could not be supplanted by the Act.97 The neighbors reportedly spent
$20,000 in legal fees, and if the court had found against them in the civil
Chapman, supra note 84, at 33.
United States v. Wagner, No. CIV.3:94-CV-2540-H, 1996 WL 148531 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 12, 1996).
'9 Id. at *9; see also Bill Lodge, Judge Says 6 Violated Housing Act in FW, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 13, 1996, at 41A.
o Lou Chapman, 6 in Ridgmar Held Liable for Housing Bias, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Mar. 13, 1996, at 1, 12.
"' Achtenberg's Neighborliness Is Questioned, Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Nov.
1, 1995, available in Westlaw, ALLNEWS file (extended version of article appearing in
the S.F. CHRON. on the same day).
' See Reynolds Holding, Berkeley Housing Dispute: When Speech Isn't Necessarily
Free, S.F. CHRON, July 29, 1994, at Al, A14; Taylor, supra note 85.
9 See Holding, supra note 92, at A14; Taylor, supra note 85.
Holding, supra note 92, at A14.
9' Taylor, supra note 85.
Edmund Mahony, Judge Dismisses Suit Against Neighborhood, HARTFORD COU-
RANT, Feb. 12, 1995, at.B1, B2.
7 Id.
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rights suit, they could have been fined up to $100,000.98 Peter Dobkin
Hall, the president of the neighborhood group, stated:
[HUD's investigation] financially ruined the neighborhood
association and terrified residents. HUD investigators pres-
sured neighbors to turn informer. Residents were afraid to
join the association or to speak out at public meetings. The
government even tried to deprive us of legal representation
by threatening to call our attorney as a witness.
We couldn't take minutes at meetings of our board be-
cause these could be seized and used as evidence against
US.
99
Nevertheless, the fight may not be over, as DOJ is reportedly appealing the
decision. 1"
Finally, residents of Bakersfield, California won a temporary injunction
to keep a commercial group home for severely retarded adults from opening
in their neighborhood.'' Altaville Residential Care Inc. operated seven
for-profit group homes in the area and would have received $148.58 per day
for each of the six residents in the proposed facility."2 Placement of a
commercial enterprise in the neighborhood violated the covenants, condi-
tions, and restrictions of the subdivision that limited the use of homes to
single family residences.0 3
HUD investigated the residents in response to a complaint by the owners
of the potential facility, and DOJ filed a discrimination complaint in October
1993, seeking compensatory and punitive damages."° The citizens were
"accused of a civil rights violation and face[d] huge fines," according to Ed
Jagels, the District Attorney in Kern County.0 5 In the course of their in-
vestigation, DOJ has sought the residents' federal and state income tax re-
turns, liability insurance policies, details of conversations with their lawyers,
and the names of all persons who attended meetings that dealt with the
opening of the group home."' Because of the intrusive investigation, the
98 Id.
99 Id.
'o Taylor, supra note 85.
'o' Sigfredo A. Cabrera, HUD Continues Its Assault on Free Speech, WALL ST. J.,
June 7, 1995, at A15.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
" Joyce Price, Federal Government Sues Five for Fighting Group Home, WASH.
TIMES, May 31, 1995, at A3.
106 Cabrera, supra note 101, at A15.
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residents offered to drop their suit against the group home if HUD would
withdraw its complaint against them."°7 HUD refused, and the case is ex-
pected to go to trial.
10 8
3. Enforcement of Zoning Laws and Restrictive Covenants
Activities to enforce zoning laws, and the laws themselves, also have
been targeted as violative of the Fair Housing Act. In United States v. Vil-
lage of Palatine,1' the municipality of Palatine, Illinois sued the owners of
Oxford House, a halfway house for recovering substance abusers, for operat-
ing in violation of a local zoning ordinance."0 Although the group home
violated the ordinance on its face, "special uses" were allowed when autho-
rized by the village, including an exemption for an unlicensed, unsupervised
group home with nine or more residents."' The owners of Oxford House
were unwilling to obtain the special approval required because they felt that
a public hearing before a zoning board would have adversely affected the
recovery of the residents by singling them out for public scrutiny." 2 The
halfway house's owners filed a complaint with HUD alleging that the mu-
nicipality had violated the Act by failing to make a reasonable accommo-
dation in its zoning laws and by seeking to evict the home's residents." '3
The village subsequently filed a complaint for violations of the zoning ordi-
nance." 4 The United States then sought a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction until its investigation of the group home's complaint
was completed."5 Despite the city's prior "exemplary record in responding
to the needs of handicapped individuals,"'"6 the magistrate reporting and
making recommendations on the United States's motion for a preliminary
injunction found that the government had demonstrated a likelihood of suc-
ceeding on the merits."7 Commenting on the case, Illinois Congressman
Henry Hyde observed that "[1]egitimate concerns of the community and
property owners are routinely ignored" in the drive to enforce the Act."'
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 37 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
110 Id. at 1232-33.
"I Id. at 1231-32.
1 Id. at 1233.
113 Id. at 1232.
114 Id. at 1232-33.
115 Id. at 1233.
11 United States v..Village of Palatine, No. 93-C-2154, 1993 WL 586699, at *12
(N.D. 11. Sept. 28, 1993).
117 Id. at *18.
118 Mitchell Locin, Palatine Tackles U.S. on Housing, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 29, 1994,
Metro Northwest section, at 1, 8.
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Nevertheless, the order enjoining the village from evicting the residents was
vacated by the Seventh Circuit, which held the group home's claim was not
ripe." 9 Palatine is distinguishable from those previously discussed because
the city protested the placement of the group home, and because the city did
not raise a First Amendment claim, but instead relied on its existing zoning
laws.
In Martin v. Constance,2 local residents of a designated historic
neighborhood in St. Louis, Missouri sought to enforce an 1.893 covenant
that limited the use of buildings to single, private residences.' The State
planned to use a dwelling as a group home for six developmentally handi-
capped males.122 The residents petitioned various government officials,
held a public meeting, and filed an action in state court.'23 The developers
of the group home sought to enjoin the enforcement of the covenant under
the Act." u Concerns about the preservation of the property and property
values were dismissed as groundless, because the State assured the home-
owners that the historic property would be maintained,lu5 and experts tes-
tified that there would be no adverse impact on real estate values or crime
rates.2 6 Instead, the court held that the residents violated the Act by inter-
fering with the prospective group home with the intent to discriminate
against the residents because of their handicapped status.27
When restrictive covenants are applied in a discriminatory manner to
prevent homes for the disabled, courts have held that the local residents are
capable of exceeding their free speech rights. In United States v. Scott,"
residents of a Russell, Kansas neighborhood tried to block the sale of a
residence to a non-profit organization that aided disabled individuals pursu-
ant to a restrictive covenant which required that the property in question to
"remain a detached single family dwelling solely for residential purpos-
es.' ' 29 In response, the owners of the residence filed a complaint alleging
that the residents had violated the Act by interfering with the sale of the
residence on the basis of the prospective residents' handicaps."' After an
119 Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1234. The court found that in order to have a ripe
claim, the village had to have been given an opportunity to make reasonable accommo-
dations, which required the group home to invoke the special use procedures. Id.
12 843 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
121 Id. at 1323.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
121 Id. at 1324-25.
126 Id. at 1324.
127 Id. at 1325.
"2 788 F. Supp. 1555 (D. Kan. 1992).
129 Id. at 1556.
130 Id. at 1556-57.
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investigation and an unsuccessful attempt to conciliate the complaint, HUD
authorized suit on behalf of the owners.
131
A federal court found that by threatening to sue the developers and by
instigating a lawsuit, the neighbors coerced, intimidated, threatened, or inter-
fered within the meaning of the Act. 3 2 As in Martin, there was evidence
that the residents' motivation to protest was a fear that the presence of a
group home for the handicapped would lower their property values.'33 The
court held, however, that to prove the claim of intentional discrimination
under the Act, it was unnecessary to demonstrate malice or that prejudice
against a handicap was the sole motivation for the defendant's ac-
tions-instead, any intentional discrimination based on a handicap was pro-
hibited."3 The court eventually ordered the opponents of the group home
to pay more than $8000 in damages.
135
Finally, at least one court has found that similar protest activities are
protected by the First Amendment. In Michigan Protection & Advocacy
Services, Inc. v. Babin,'36 local residents opposed a decision by the State
to aid in the establishment in their neighborhood of a group home for the
developmentally disabled.'37 An advocacy group brought an action under
the Act on behalf of the developmentally disabled persons.' The citizens'
activities in opposition to the group included protesting through writing
letters, contacting the media, organizing a town meeting, and discussing
their concerns with various public officials. 39 That notwithstanding, the
court held that such protest activity was protected, because while a letter on
the potential danger of group homes
exhibits concern and perhaps misguided zeal, it cannot rea-
sonably be termed threatening or intimidating.
131 Id. at 1557.
132 Id. at 1562.
133 Id. at 1560.
134 Id. at 1562.
13' Holding, supra note 92, at A14. At least one other court has relied heavily on the
Scott decision. In Deep E. Tex. Regional Mental Health & Mental Servs. v. Kinnear,
877 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994), a citizen tried to prevent the placement of group
home for six mentally handicapped persons in his community. Id. at 553. The Texas
Court of Appeals noted that the Act prohibits the enforcement of restrictive covenants
that have the effect of discriminating against the handicapped. Id. at 558. The court
found that by attempting to enforce the restrictive covenants, the neighboring property
owner violated the Act and could be sued by the social service agency. Id
136 799 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Mich. 1992), af'd, 18 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1994).
137 Id. at 701.
138 Id. at 702.
139 Id. at 717.
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... [O]rganizing and appearing at a meeting... lacked
any characteristic which would remove it from First Amend-
ment protection. This meeting gave concerned citizens a
chance to express their views on a public issue and to hear
[others' views]. As such, it represents the purest form of
protected First Amendment activity.14
The court determined that, absent any use or threatened use of any force
or coercion, the neighbors did not interfere with the establishment of a
group home by soliciting, collecting, and contributing money for purchase
of a residence so as to prevent it from being used as group home. 4' The
court did not consider the intent of the protestors, and in fact recognized
that the neighbors' views could be regarded as "ill-advised, uninformed, and
even distasteful."'42 Nevertheless, the court held that such protest activities
did not incite imminent lawlessness and were therefore protected by the
First Amendment. 4
3
Applying the "clear and present" danger test to the neighbors' speech,
the court reasoned that "unrestricted expression is crucial in a free society
and should not be quelled simply because the government decides that it is
undesirable. Rather, before a court may suppress undesirable expression, that
expression must be such as would result in imminent violence."'" The
court noted that the First Amendment does not permit "unbridled expres-
sion," and stated that the government might limit a protest campaign if it
was disruptive or interfered with the use of private property. 45 Neverthe-
less, in reviewing the types of protest activities engaged in by the neighbors,
the court could find no "characteristic which would remove [them] from
First Amendment protection."'46
140 Id. at 718-19.
141 Id. at 726.
142 Id. at 720.
143 Id. at 717-19 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (noting that
"the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to
incite or produce such action")).
144 Id. at 718.
145 Id. at 719. The court in Babin found support from Resident Advisory Board v.
Rizzo, 503 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Pa. 1980), where a court found that members of a neigh-
borhood group had protested the construction of a low income housing project with
threats, physical violence, intimidation, and coercion. In Rizzo, the court considered the
rights of the neighbors to demonstrate and limited the form of their protest, but did not
prohibit them from protesting. Id. at 389.
146 Babin, 799 F. Supp. at 719.
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The foregoing cases share a common theme: neighbors and homeowners
who have legitimate concerns about their own property values and personal
safety are at odds with fair housing developers and advocates who see any
opposition as a form of discrimination. Although some of the protest activity
might certainly be attributed to unreasonable prejudice against the disabled,
some reasonable explanations also motivate the community actions. Some of
the neighbors' views and actions may be distasteful to the proponents of fair
housing, but according to at least one court, they are not sufficiently intimi-
dating, coercive, or interfering so as to be removed from First Amendment
protection.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RESULTING
GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF FAIR HOUSING INVESTIGATIONS
A. The New Guidelines
The public largely condemned the publicized Fair Housing investiga-
tions.'47 Newspapers in the cities where HUD has conducted investigations
have reacted negatively, with headlines such as Berkeley Housing Dispute;
When Speech Isn't Necessarily Free in California,4 ' HUD Continues Its
Assault on Free Speech in New York,'4 9 and Forget Free Speech in Vir-
ginia. "' One San Francisco editor even referred to the Berkeley investiga-
tion as a "10-month campaign of terror."'' HUD's response to this public
criticism has been mixed. While HUD spokespersons consistently insist that
no constitutional rights are being violated,' the discord between HUD
and free speech advocates has explicitly been acknowledged. After the case
against the Berkeley residents was dropped, then-Assistant Secretary for Fair
Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) at HUD, Roberta Achtenberg, pre-
147 In addition to the numerous newspaper articles and editorials cited in this Note,
the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression awarded HUD a
"Jefferson Muzzle" for conducting investigations on community organizations for op-
posing public housing projects. The privately financed center gives out awards annually
that spotlight people and organizations who have attempted to limit free speech. GOP
Contract Signers atop List, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 14, 1995, at B4.
Holding, supra note 92, at Al.
149 Mac Donald, supra note 50.
ISo RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 1994, at A16.
151 Debra J. Saunders, Mayor's Race: The Naked and the Nasty, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
3, 1995, at A23.
152 See, e.g., Holding, supra note 92, at A14 (noting that "HUD spokesman John
Phillips said ... that there is a legal difference between asking questions about a pro-
ject and 'advocating that housing not be provided to somebody because of attributes
they have').
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dicted: "Berkeley will not be the last instance of friction between fair-hous-
ing and free-speech rights. We can anticipate more cases of this kind.""'
In response to this unfavorable publicity, Assistant Secretary Achtenberg
issued a September 2, 1994 memorandum that provided guidelines on how
HUD should handle potential First Amendment problems that arise during
their fair housing investigations. 15 4 In the memorandum, Achtenberg stated
that "the Department recognizes ... that, for many private citizens, being
the subject of a 'federal investigation' can be inherently and unavoidably
'chilling.'" 55
The primary focus of the guidelines is that HUD will not accept a com-
plaint involving public activities that "are directed toward achieving action
by a governmental entity or official; and do not involve force, physical
harm, or a clear threat of force or physical harm." '156 Such protected public
activities may include: distributing flyers, pamphlets, brochures, posters, or
other written materials to the public; holding community meetings; writing
articles or letters to or making statements in a newspaper; testifying at open
public hearings; communicating with a governmental entity concerning an
official government matter, excluding litigation filed in court; or conducting
peaceful demonstrations.'57 "[M]embership lists, fundraising information or
financial data" are also to be protected from investigation. 5 '
Action still may be brought under the Act in certain circumstances, for
example, when protest activities are repeatedly directed to a captive audi-
ence, such as protests close to an individual's home.'59 No complaint in-
volving speech is to be accepted for filing in the absence of written approval
from HUD headquarters. 6 ° In addition, investigations under the new
guidelines must "be prompt, narrowly tailored to gather sufficient prelimi-
nary data to allow such a decision to be made, and conducted in close con-
sultation with counsel.'' 6. Although Achtenberg's memorandum states that
"great care must be taken to avoid chilling the First Amendment rights of
's3 Achtenberg, supra note 68, at A17.
's, HUD Memorandum, supra note 2; see also Robert S. Swierczek, Achtenberg
Issues Enforcement Guidelines for Fair Housing Cases Involving First Amendment, 22
Hous. & Dev. Rep. (BNA) 257 (Sept. 12, 1994). Copies were sent to all FHEO office
directors, enforcement directors, compliance directors, staff, and the Office of Investiga-
tions.
15 HUD Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1 n.1.
116 Id. at 2.
157 Id.
58 Id. at 6.
159 Id. at 4 n.4; see, e.g., People Helpers Found. v. City of Richmond, 781 F. Supp.
1132 (E.D. Va. 1992).
16 HUD Memorandum, supra note 2, at 5.
161 Id.
1242 [Vol. 4:3
"FAIR HOUSING" AND FREE SPEECH
the speakers,"'162 it concedes that HUD will continue to investigate those
individuals who protest housing decisions if "the facts available to the De-
partment do not reasonably indicate the precise applicability of the First
Amendment."' 63 Therefore, it appears that HUD will continue its practice
of scrutinizing protesting citizens, even if the inquiry is only preliminary, to
determine if the First Amendment applies. If the free speech issues appear
unclear, if the speech is directed to someone other than a government offi-
cial or entity, or if the citizens choose to take their challenges to court,
seemingly HUD will continue to investigate under the new guidelines.'
Past complaint filings and current HUD practices suggest that HUD will
continue to investigate a large number of fair housing complaints.
HUD has a policy of investigating every complaint filed," of which it
receives approximately 10,000 each year. 16  During Achtenberg's two
years at HUD, the agency's overall budget was cut, but the fair housing
budget increased from $15 million to $26 million. 67 In 1994, the number
of investigations conducted by HUD was reportedly up 100% from the Rea-
gan-Bush years. 61 Citizen protests have been the majority of HUD's Fair
Housing Act investigations.
169
HUD has consistently been unable to conclude its investigations and
make a reasonable cause determination within the 100-day period mandated
by the FHAA 70 In some cases, the determination stage has not been
reached for months or even years after the 100-day period. 7' Such delays
have undermined the congressional goal of quickly processing FHAA com-
plaints, and transformed what Congress intended to be a brief investigation
162 Id.
16 Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
'" See Mac Donald, supra note 50, at A19. See generally Achtenberg, supra note 68,
at A17.
" See Peaceful Protest OK, HUD Says Agency Pledges to Respect the Right to
Actively Oppose Projects, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 3, 1994, at 3A.
16 HUD to Stop Investigating Protests, supra note 67, at A3.
167 Elizabeth Schwinn, Achtenberg's Work Praised by HUD Chief, S.F. EXAMINER,
Apr. 14, 1995, at A20.
168 Bradley Inman, Achtenberg Brings New Activism to HUD Job, S.F. EXAMINER,
Oct. 2, 1994, at E3.
169 Id.
170 See Robert G. Schwemm, The Future of Fair Housing Litigation, 26 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 745, 753 n.60 (1993) (citing HUD reports from 1991 and 1990, which
reported that the "'number of cases in 1991 reaching over 100 days totaled 4,791,' a
year in which the number of HUD-filed complaints was 5657," and that "'64 percent of
HUD's complaint load was over 100 days old in 1990"').
171 See, e.g., United States v. Aspen Square Mgmt. Co., 817 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D.
111. 1993) (HUD's reasonable cause determination occurred over 350 days after the
statutory time limit had expired).
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that precedes potential government action into an intrusive governmental
action in and of itself.'72
B. Constitutionality of Fair Housing Investigations Under the New
Guidelines
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government' for a redress of
grievances."' 73 Any governmental action is limited by the First Amend-
ment.' Although HUD's actions are not in fact laws, they are enforce-
ment of laws based on HUD's interpretation of its statutory authority.
"Law" is not limited to statutory enactments: any exercise of power by
Congress constitutes a law, and any administrative regulation adopted pursu-
ant to statutory authority also constitutes a law for First Amendment purpos-
es. 75 The Supreme Court has held that even a notification by a govern-
mental agency that certain works are "objectionable," with an implicit threat
of prosecution, may constitute an unconstitutional law.'76 Although a gov-
ernmental action may only have an indirect effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights, it nevertheless may be subject to constitutional challeng-
es.'77 "[C]onstitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling'
172 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (a)(1)(B)(iv) (1988) (directing that "the Secretary
shall ... complete such investigation within 100 days after the filing of the
complaint ... unless it is impracticable to do so") (emphasis added); Baumgardner v.
HUD, 960 F.2d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting the importance of promptness in the
FHAA's administrative scheme); H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 16, at 33, reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2194 (expressing congressional intent that all but "exceptional
cases" must be investigated within 100 days after the charge).
173 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
174 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.01[A] (1984).
171 Id. For example, the Court stated:
Clearly, [a congressional] investigation is subject to the command that the Con-
gress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or press or assembly. While
it is true that there is no statute to be reviewed, and that an investigation is not a
law, nevertheless an investigation is part of law-making. It is justified solely as an
adjunct to the legislative process. The First Amendment may be invoked against
infringement of the protected freedoms by law or lawmaking.
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957).
176 See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (striking down state commis-
sion practice of notifying distributors of certain books and magazines deemed objection-
able, and of the commission's duty to recommend prosecuting purveyors of obscenity).
177 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972) (holding that the existence of the
Army's intelligence-gathering system alone did not have a chilling effect on the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights without evidence of specific action against plaintiffs).
But see Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461, 462-64 (2d Cir. 1978) (hold-
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effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition
against the exercise of First Amendment rights.'
178
The modes of expression that trigger HUD's investigations, even under
the new guidelines, implicate the core First Amendment guarantees: free
speech, freedom of assembly, and the right to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.7 9 Any investigations by HUD of protestors serve to
chill the exercise of citizens' free speech, freedom of assembly, and right to
petition the government. Unfortunately, the guidelines leave enough loop-
holes to allow continued intrusive governmental scrutiny. The list of protect-
ed activities that HUD will permit without investigation appears extensive,
but its omissions are significant. Public activities aimed at government offi-
cials and entities are protected under the guidelines, but private market com-
petition, such as in the Gramercy Park case,18 is not included. Open hear-
ings are protected, but private meetings are apparently not; membership
rosters, participant lists, and financial data are covered under the guidelines,
but correspondence and files may not be protected. Most disturbingly, HUD
can continue to investigate citizens who chose to protest through the justice
system, because litigation in court is expressly excluded from protection by
the guidelines.'
Although the guidelines are referred to as "substantive and procedural
restrictions,"'' 82 they apparently have not significantly reduced the number
of HUD investigations. When the guidelines were released, Achtenberg
stated that HUD had thirty-four current cases that appeared to involve free-
speech issues, but by late 1994, only eleven had been dismissed under the
new guidelines.8 3 Despite the creation of these guidelines, HUD has con-
tinued in its pursuit of civil rights claims against individuals who assert free
speech issues. "
ing a tenant' whose lease was discontinued because of her active participation in a
tenants' association had an injury under Laird).
178 Laird, 408 U.S. at 11. Intrusive governmental investigations have been interpreted
as chilling First Amendment rights in other contexts. In Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85
(2d Cir. 1992), the administration of a state university began investigating a tenured
professor's controversial outside writings. Id. at 89. The professor claimed that his First
Amendment rights had been inhibited because he turned down invitations to speak or
write about his views for fear of being discharged. Id. Because the university could
discipline him for exercising his free speech rights and because he was under an intru-
sive investigation, the Second Circuit upheld the district court's finding that an implicit
"threat of specific future harm" existed, causing a chilling injury. Id. at 89-90.
179 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"8 See discussion supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
181 HUD Memorandum, supra note 2, at 2 n.3.
182 Id. at 1.
183 HUD to Stop Investigating Protests, supra note 67, at A3.
18 Residents of a Fort Worth, Texas suburb were charged with a discrimination com-
plaint based on protest actions that occurred in 1991; the case was only recently adjudi-
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1. Incidental Limitation
When "'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regu-
lating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms."'85 The goals of the Fair Housing Act are
concededly an important government interest. Nevertheless, the conduct that
HUD is discouraging is precisely that which the First Amendment is de-
signed to protect, so the resulting "chill" on free speech is not merely an
"incidental limitation" on a nonspeech element.
The Supreme Court has deemed governmental regulation justifiable with
respect to the First Amendment
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if
it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.
8 6
The investigations conducted by HUD fail on the latter two requirements.
Because HUD investigates certain organizations based on their methods of
protest and the content thereof, the government interest is directly related to
suppressing the protestors' freedom of expression. Furthermore, the deterrent
effect on all protest speech is greater than what is essential to promote non-
discriminatory housing."8 7
cated. See discussion supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text. In addition, the govern-
ment has filed a lawsuit against Bakersfield, California residents, the investigation of
whom began in 1992. See Taylor, supra note 85. Finally, DOJ is reportedly appealing a
decision in Connecticut in which the District Court ruled against the government on a
civil rights claim, finding that the defendant residents were exercising their First
Amendment rights. Id.
1"5 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
'8' Id. at 377.
'87 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). Wayte dealt with the Military
Selective Service Act. The government prosecuted only those who reported themselves
as having violated the law, or who were reported by others, for failing to register. Peti-
tioner argued that such policy created a content-based regulatory system which violated
his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Id. at 610-11. The Court applied the
O'Brien test, and found that all four requirements were met in part because "[flew
interests can be more compelling than a nation's need to ensure its own security." Id. at
611. Accordingly, the Court held that the government's passive enforcement and selec-
tive prosecution of the Military Selective Service Act did not violate the First Amend-
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The First Amendment reflects the concept of democratic self govern-
ment, and "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open."'88 The rights
of freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of assembly can pro-
vide the people with the power to monitor, condemn, and correct govern-
ment wrongdoing and abuse of power. 89 Citizen challenges and demon-
strations against fair housing projects, regardless of their motivations, cer-
tainly implicate these First Amendment ideals.
2. Chilling Effect
As previously indicated, "abridging" within the First Amendment con-
text may occur even if the action in question does not directly prohibit or
punish speech.' "[T]he fact that no direct restraint or punishment is im-
posed upon speech or assembly does not determine the free speech question.
Under some circumstances, indirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the
same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as impris-
onment, fines, injunctions, or taxes.''. A "chilling effect" in the First
Amendment context "occurs when individuals seeking to engage in activity
protected by the First Amendment are deterred from so doing by govern-
mental regulations not specifically directed at that protected activity." 1"
ment, because the enforcement was no greater than what was essential to serve the im-
portant interest. Id. at 614.
Wayte is distinguishable from the HUD investigations in that the petitioner in
Wayte was already breaking a law, and essentially trying to use the First Amendment to
immunize himself from prosecution. The speech that the petitioner claimed was being
infringed upon was his own self-reporting to the government of his crime. The Court
expressed doubt that his First Amendment rights had been injured, noting that
nonregistrants could protest registration and still avoid any danger of prosecution. See
id. at 611 n.12. "On principle, such a view would allow any criminal to obtain immuni-
ty from prosecution simply by reporting himself and claiming that he did so in order to
'protest' the law." Id. at 614. In the case of HUD investigations, however, the speakers
are not conscientious objectors trying to make a point, and the speech that spurs HUD's
investigation is not "I broke the law," as in Wayte, but rather, legitimate citizen protests
of fair housing projects.
18 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
189 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 593-97 (1980) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
"g NIMMER, supra note 174, § 4.07 (1984 & Supp. 1992); see also supra notes 174-
78 and accompanying text.
191 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402, reh'g denied, 339
U.S. 990 (1950).
"9 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling
Effect", 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978) (emphasis omitted).
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A First Amendment chilling effect may be created by governmental
regulations in two ways. 93 First, a person may be deterred from engaging
in potentially punishable activities because the regulation defines imprecisely
what may be said.' Second, because a specific type of expression has
been identified as appropriate for regulation, it may create a governmental
and even societal stigma on the potential speakers. 95 HUD's investigations
are "chilling" from both perspectives: the standards for investigation out-
lined in the guidelines are imprecise enough to deter a concerned citizen
from expressing any opinion; further, a stigma against such protests argu-
ably has been created by HUD's investigations. The Court's few substantive
references to chilling effect notions appear most frequently in cases involv-
ing overbroad or vague legislation.'96 Fear of one's activities being moni-
tored and found illegal also provides a great deterrent effect: "[t]he very es-
sence of a chilling effect is an act of deterrence."'97 Clearly, HUD's intru-
sive investigatory powers serve to deter citizen protests.
Deterred by a fear of investigation or punishment, individuals will re-
frain from lawfully speaking out. Not only are they harmed by this non-
exercise of their constitutional right, but there is a "general societal loss
which results when the freedoms guaranteed by the [F]irst [A]mendment are
not exercised."' 98 The fact that the guidelines preclude investigations into
actions that specifically implicate the First Amendment and which are not
coercive, intimidating, or threatening does not solve the problem with
HUD's investigations. There is still a legitimate fear that lawful conduct
may be punished because of the fallibility inherent in the legal process; that
protestors may be punished for speech that they reasonably believed to be
' Fred C. Zacharias, Flowcharting the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 936,
987 (1987).
" See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519-21 (1972) (finding prohibition of
"opprobrious words or abusive language" invalid because vague and overbroad).
195 Zacharias, supra note 193, at 987.
" Id. at 988. The Supreme Court has placed substantive reliance on a regulation's
chilling effect in a few contexts other than overbreadth. For example, the Court has
considered whether legislative committee investigations were designed to further legiti-
mate legislative goals or to expose and chill the rights of the investigations' targets. See
DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966) (holding that the defendant was
entitled to rely on the First Amendment to justify refusing to disclose information re-
garding his past political affiliations); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 550-58 (1963) (holding that a state legislative committee was not
entitled to compel an association's president to produce membership records). Similarly,
some state courts have applied a comparable analysis to police investigations and sur-
veillance of political activists. See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago,
627 F. Supp. 1044, 1051 (N.D. II1. 1985) (finding a reasonable and objective "chill"
claim where police infiltrated organization).
197 Schauer, supra note 192, at 689.
198 Id. at 693.
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protected by the guidelines.' 99 Moreover, some activities excepted by the
guidelines' should be otherwise protected by the First Amendment. The
complexity of the concept of free speech and the public's natural distaste for
offensive or unpopular opinions provides a degree of uncertainty in First
Amendment cases.2"1 The most difficult questions arise when challenged
expression walks the line between protected and unprotected speech, and
consequently, the level of deterrence for those speakers is the highest.'
3. The Motive or Content of Speech
Generally, the Supreme Court has protected speech that does not directly
lead to illegal action, regardless of motive. 2 3 In Cox v. Louisiana,2' Jus-
tice Goldberg wrote that "a 'function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger.'""
Even when competing against other fundamental constitutional
rights--even other First Amendment rights--courts have often protected free
speech. For example, in Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City of San Fran-
cisco,' a neighborhood association circulated a petition protesting a pro-
posal to permit a church to conduct services in a residential neighbor-
hood.2' The church charged the association with conspiring to deprive it
199 See id. at 695.
See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
2o Schauer, supra note 192, at 696.
I' ld. Schauer later states:
The lawful advocacy of ideas is often most effective when it approaches incite-
ment; to punish mistakenly a speaker for exhortations ... is to suppress protect-
ed speech at the point where it may have the greatest impact. Moreover, the prob-
ability of error increases as we draw near to that legal line dividing the punishable
and the protected. [A margin for error] must be drawn in favor of free speech.
Id. at 723.
" See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that "the constitu-
tional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action").
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
Id. at 551-52 (quoting Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). In
Cox, the Court held that a student's right of free speech and free assembly were in-
fringed by his conviction for disturbing the peace during a peaceful protest against ra-
cial discrimination and segregation. Cox, 379 U.S. at 544-52.
896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 (1990).
2o7 Id. at 1223.
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of its First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.' The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the association's campaign against the granting of the permit
fell within the First Amendment's protection of the right to petition the gov-
ernment for redress of grievances.2"
Even if the protestors' motives in the Fair Housing Act cases are based
partly on irrational prejudice, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to limit
or prohibit the exercise of free speech simply because it deals with unpopu-
lar subjects or points of view. In Texas v. Johnson,210 the Court held that
desecration of the American flag was protected speech under the First
Amendment. The Court stated, "[ijf there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."21' Indeed, courts have consistently protected speech and
ideas that many find hateful. People may criticize the president by misrepre-
senting his opinions;212 members of the Nazi party may march through a
largely Jewish city;2 3 people may vulgarly criticize the draft in a public
place;" 4 and make malicious political, religious, and ethnic characteriza-
tions to large crowds." "[Above] all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. '21 6 The courts specifically have
protected protest speech because such speech contributes to the development
of ideas. "It is precisely those who are least well-known who most desper-
ately require access to means of attracting attention., 217
The Court reiterated that the First Amendment generally precludes the
government from prohibiting speech or expressive conduct because of disap-
proval of the ideas expressed therein when it invalidated a "hate crime" law
that criminalized bias-motivated speech or acts in RA. V.v. City of St.
208 Id. at 1226.
209 Id. at 1226-27.
210 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
211 Id. at 414; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding a St.
Paul ordinance unconstitutional because it imposed special prohibitions on speakers who
express disfavored views on race, color, creed, religion, or gender).
212 Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
213 Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.) (holding an ordinance unconstitutional
that prohibited dissemination of materials that promote hatred towards persons on the
basis of their heritage, and holding that a permit for a proposed march could not be
denied for anticipated violations of the ordinance), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
214 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
215 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
216 Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding unconstitutional as an
impermissible distinction a city ordinance prohibiting picketing around a school except
for peaceful labor picketing).
217 Rhode Island Chapter of the Nat'l Women's Political Caucus, Inc. v. Rhode Is-
land Lottery Comm'n, 609 F. Supp. 1403, 1413 (D.R.I. 1985).
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Paul.2 1 The Court found that the city's anti-hate-speech statute was
impermissibly content-based in violation of the First Amendment, because
"it prohibit[ed] otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the sub-
jects the speech addresse[d]., 219 St. Paul asserted that a compelling interest
in enforcing its regulation of speech was to "ensure the basic human rights
of members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimina-
tion, including the right of such group members to live in peace where they
wish."' 22 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, conceded that the state had
a compelling interest in protecting the rights of traditionally disfavored
groups, but argued that the ordinance was not necessary to achieve this state
interest. 1 The Court's conclusion rested on the distinction between per-
missible content-based regulation and unconstitutional viewpoint discrimina-
tion.'m "The government may not regulate [speech] based on hostility-or
favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed."'
Content-based regulations are based on the subject matter and can be
upheld if the particular class of speech has low First Amendment value.'
Viewpoint-based regulations, however, distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the views expressed. Because the impetus
for the regulation is the speaker's ideology, the First Amendment places a
heavier burden on viewpoint-based regulation. 2' HUD's investigations pol-
icy is clearly viewpoint-based: pro-housing advocates who support the
placement of group facilities for homeless, AIDS hospices, and the like are
218 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). In RA.V., a group of teenagers burned a homemade
cross inside a fenced yard of an African-American family in the middle of the night. Id.
at 379. The defendant was prosecuted under St. Paul's bias-motivated crime statute,
which provided that
"[w]hoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance).
219 Id. at 381.
220 Id. at 395.
221 Id. at 395-96.
22 Id. at 391.
2 Id. at 386.
2' "[C]ertain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech are no essen-
tial part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942). Libel, obscenity, and fighting words are examples of classes of speech with low
First Amendment value. Id.
225 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
§ 3.02[21[c][iii] (1994).
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allowed to voice their opinions without fear of repercussions; community
members who oppose such facilities are scrutinized.
Under the new guidelines, HUD will continue to investigate the constitu-
tionally protected activities of citizens. Freedom of expression includes ac-
tivities such as handing out pamphlets and posting signs, as well as the
words within those pamphlets and signs.226 Printed materials such as these
are protected by the First Amendment because they are an accessible, inex-
pensive, and nondisruptive form of communication: pamphlets "have been
historic weapons in defense of liberty., 227 Freedom of expression also ex-
tends to picketing, marching, and other kinds of demonstrations.2  Seeking
out elected representatives to protest or lobby for a cause is a protected
form of free speech (which also implicates the right to petition the govern-
ment),229 as is soliciting contributions and spending money to support
211opinion.
4. Exception to Free Speech: Intimidation
There are few instances in which the Court has been willing to infringe
upon a citizen's constitutional right to free speech. One such instance is
when the speech is intimidating. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc. ,231 operators of a clinic that provided abortions sought to broaden a
previously entered injunction, complaining that access to the clinic was
impeded by protesters and intimidating to patients. 232 The anti-abortion
26 See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (holding that peaceful distribution at a shopping mall
entrance of handbills that urged customers not to shop there was not an unfair practice
of threatening, coercing, or restraining a person from doing business with another);
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (holding void on its face a city ordinance
that prohibited distribution of circulars, pamphlets, and other literature without a per-
mit).
22 Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452.
See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (holding that the arrest
of peaceful protestors for marching around the State House infringed on their consti-
tutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition the
government for redress of grievances).
229 See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (holding that the First Amend-
ment was implicated in a congressional committee's investigations of attempts to influ-
ence public opinion).
230 See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding that solic-
itation of charitable contributions is protected by free speech); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act limiting
expenditures by candidates on their own behalf violate the candidates' rights to freedom
of speech).
231 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
232 Id. at 2521.
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protestors challenged the injunction against picketing within a buffer zone
and noise restrictions as a violation of their First Amendment right to free
speech.233 The Court held that the noise restrictions and thirty-six foot
buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveway imposed by the in-
junction were content-neutral, despite the fact that they restricted only the
speech of the anti-abortion protesters, and that the restriction did not burden
more speech than was necessary.2" The lawful protest activities of most
public housing opponents have not risen to the intimidation level of anti-
abortion activists, and thus as of now probably could not be subject to regu-
lation prohibiting intimidating speech. If protestors chose to surround a
homeless shelter, carrying signs, yelling aspersions through megaphones,
and threatening residents, the speech probably would be unconstitutionally
intimidating. The cases that HUD has investigated, however, have centered
around peaceful neighbor meetings and activities. The citizens in these cases
have not sought any direct contact with potential residents of the "fair hous-
ing" facilities.235
Admittedly, not all of the protests being investigated by HUD have been
so peaceful. The Court previously has determined that certain kinds of
speech may be constitutionally limited as part of behavior which amounts to
unlawful discrimination or interference in the civil rights context.2  The
Fair Housing Act purports to limit behavior, including speech which is
coercive, intimidating, threatening, or harassing. In People Helpers Founda-
tion, Inc. v. City of Richmond,237 a housing group successfully stated a
claim for violation of the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants, who were residents of the area, coerced and intimidated them on
the basis of race.2 3' The neighbors allegedly made derogatory remarks
about residents of the apartment building, organized groups of people to
threaten and intimidate volunteers for organizations which placed tenants,
233 Id. at 2526-28.
2 Id. at 2530. The Court, however, struck down the state court's injunction provi-
sions relating to a private property buffer zone, "images observable," a 300-foot no
approach zone around the clinic, and a 300-foot buffer zone around residences of clinic
staff. Id. at 2528-30; see also Medlin v. Palmer, 874 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that a content neutral speech regulation which prohibited use of hand-held amplifier
within 150 feet of abortion or other medical facility did not violate the free speech
rights of demonstrators).
23 See discussion supra parts I.B.1.-2.
236 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (holding that act
requiring Jaycees to accept women members did not violate freedom of speech and
association); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (holding that applica-
tion of Title VII prohibition on gender-based discrimination did not infringe on First
Amendment rights).
237 781 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Va. 1992).
238 Id. at 1133.
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photographed the building occupants and volunteers in an intimidating man-
ner, and directly threatened them. 9 The court denied defendants' motion
to dismiss the claim, finding that the plaintiffs stated a proper claim of coer-
cion, threats, or interference."0
Similarly, in United States v. Gilbert,"x the defendant argued that
prosecution under section 3631 of the Fair Housing Act violated his First
Amendment right to free speech.2" The government alleged that the
defendant's letter to the director of an adoption agency-which placed Afri-
can-American and Asian children for adoption--denounced the actions of
the office, and that his flyers threatened death to minorities and to those
who associate with them. 3 The defendant was also charged with verbally
threatening a person, physically threatening a person with his car, ordering
his dog to attack a person, and spitting in the face of a mentally retarded
African-American child. 4 Whether the expression alleged met the intent
requirement was found to be an issue for the trier of fact. Nevertheless, the
court held that an illegal mode of conduct-intimidation-is not protected
by the First Amendment simply because speech, as opposed to direct action,
is involved.4 5 The defendant could not use the Constitution to shield his
illegal acts of intimidation.
People Helpers and Gilbert represent a departure from the usual cases
that HUD has investigated; in Gilbert, the flyers and the direct physical
intimidation were forms of communication aimed directly at protected per-
sons. In most of the investigations subject to HUD guidelines, the communi-
cation is not directly addressed to protected persons; there is no attempt to
physically intimidate the potential residents of group housing.
'39 Id. at 1135-36.
' Id. at 1134-36; see also Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718 (11th Cir.
1991) (holding that neighbors' acts of leaving threatening notes, striking plaintiffs' cars,
shouting obscenities, and spitting at plaintiffs were beyond the scope of free speech
protection).
241 813 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860 (1987).
242 Id. at 1528-30. Section 3631 imposes penalties on "[w]hoever ... by force or
threat of force willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure,
intimidate or interfere with" those protected under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1988).
" Gilbert, 813 F.2d at 1525.
2 Id.
" Id. at 1529. On appeal after remand, the Ninth Circuit found sufficient evidence to
uphold the defendant's conviction of interfering with housing rights based on force or
threat of force. United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 456-57 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1082 (1990).
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C. Constitutionality of HUD's Enforcement
The constitutional problem with HUD's enforcement of the Fair Housing
Act, even after the implementation of the guidelines, is that HUD has identi-
fied citizen protest speech as a category to be regulated, scrutinized, and
investigated. Cataloging a type of speech in this manner deters those who
may share the same views and "chills" their tendency to speak out. The
threat that citizens should be subject to such investigations if they cross
some discretionary line constitutes government intimidation, which directly
inhibits citizens' First Amendment rights. While coercive and intimidating
speech arguably is unprotected by the First Amendment, the HUD regula-
tions that prohibit such speech are overbroad because the regulations burden
more than intimidating speech.
The chilling effect of HUD's investigations is similar to the goal of
"SLAPPs"-strategic lawsuits against public participation. SLAPPs are civil
suits filed against political opposition, commonly claiming discrimination,
defamation, conspiracy, or interference with contract.46 Those that file
such actions hope that each day the suit is pending successfully prevents or
deters citizens from pursuing First Amendment rights to free speech and to
petition the government. There are four general motives for filing SLAPPs:
(1) intent to retaliate for successful opposition on an issue of public interest;
(2) attempt to prevent expected future, competent opposition on subsequent
public policy issues; (3) intent to intimidate and to send a message that op-
position will be punished; and (4) a view of litigation and the use of the
court system as simply another tool in a strategy to win a political or eco-
nomic battle.47 Though often ultimately unsuccessful, such suits serve to
remove opposition through intimidation. Similarly, even if HUD eventually
finds no violation, the protesting citizens who have been investigated under
the Fair Housing Act have lost their right to privacy, incurred significant
legal fees, and been discouraged from pursuing their claims and speaking
out.,,
Courts are willing to protect a defendant's First Amendment rights in
SLAPP actions. In Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District
See, e.g., George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participa-
tion, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 9 & nn. 11-16 (1989).
"' Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 23, 30 (1989).
2 See discussion supra parts I.B.1.-2. One article reported that the HUD investiga-
tors in Berkeley, California "offered the residents a plea bargain-reduced fines if
they'd promise to shut up." Paul Mulshine, H4 I'm Big Brother; I'll Be Your Waiter
Tonight, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 26, 1995, § 10 (Perspective/Opinion), at 3.
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Court," the Colorado Supreme Court applied a heightened standard to
such cases in order to safeguard the constitutional rights of citizens. Accord-
ing to the court, when the defendant in the SLAPP action files a motion to
dismiss, citing First Amendment rights, the court shifts the burden to the
plaintiff to make sufficient showing that the defendant's petitioning activities
were not immunized from liability under the First Amendment because (1)
the defendant's claims were not reasonably supported by the facts; (2) the
primary purpose of defendant's protest was to harass the plaintiff; and (3)
the defendant's petitioning activity had the capacity to adversely affect a
legal interest of the plaintiff." °
These civil actions present an interesting parallel to HUD investigations.
When a housing advocacy group files a complaint with HUD about a citizen
protest, it is HUD's policy to investigate. Even under the new guidelines,
though the purpose of the inquiry is only a preliminary determination of the
First Amendment implications, the federal agency will place some degree of
scrutiny on the protesting citizens. If the free speech issues seem unclear, or
if the speech is directed to someone other than a government official or
entity, or if the citizens are taking their protests to court, HUD will continue
the investigation. Fair housing advocates can accomplish the intimidating
goal of SLAPPs without actually filing any suits themselves; these advo-
cates simply report any instances of intimidation to the federal government,
and any protests that might disturb their cause are investigated, and there-
fore discouraged.
CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDATIONS TO BRING THE GUIDELINES INTO
COMPLIANCE WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
HUD has interpreted the "coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere" pro-
vision and the investigatory powers of the Fair Housing Act in such a man-
ner so as to permit violation of citizens' First Amendment rights to free
speech and to petition the government. Although the Act's provision against
interference with the housing rights of the handicapped is not unconstitu-
tional, it is being enforced in an unconstitutional manner. The investigations
conducted by HUD amount to governmental control over the content of the
speech of private individuals. The Supreme Court has stated that
"[r]egulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of
the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amend-
ment."'" In this case, HUD is discriminating based on the viewpoint of
677 P.2d. 1361 (Colo. 1984).
250 Id. at 1369.
251 Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984) (plurality opinion) (holding that
the provision of a statute permitting publication of illustrations of U.S. currency only
for certain stated purposes was discrimination on the basis of content).
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the speakers: pro-housing speech is not investigated, and therefore favored,
while speech that opposes, questions, or criticizes the placement of residenc-
es for the handicapped may lead to government inquiry. This kind of regu-
lation based on favoritism towards the "fair housing" ideology is unconstitu-
tional.
The housing rights of the handicapped do not override their neighbors'
rights. The very purpose of protected speech is to ensure free and open
public debate; by conducting intrusive investigations of those who choose to
engage in public debate, the government impermissibly "chills" free speech.
Opponents of housing projects, regardless of their intent, can be intrusively
investigated for months without any recourse. The fear of disruptive investi-
gations by HUD discourages similarly situated neighborhood groups from
participating in issues that affect their communities. By punishing protesters
in this manner, HUD dissuades future opposition on subsequent public poli-
cy issues.
While HUD's guidelines may restrict HUD's more obvious violations of
the First Amendment, HUD should restructure their guidelines to eliminate
any possible infringement on free speech and the unfettered operation of
local political processes. HUD should establish a threshold test before ac-
cepting any case for investigation, creating a procedure for throwing out
complaints that could compromise citizens' First Amendment rights, rather
than investigating every grievance filed.
First, the Department should consider the identity of the speaker. If the
protestors of a proposed project are individual citizens who have mobilized
into community groups, as opposed to a municipality or an incorporated
public interest group, then the Department should relax its investigatory
mechanism. These persons have a legitimate, personal interest as to whether
a group home is placed in their area. There is a critical difference between
an existing organization that seeks to interfere with the creation of all hous-
ing facilities for the homeless, for example, and a group of neighbors who
may not want a particular group home established on their street. If the
speakers are part of a local organization that is focused on local issues, then
HUD should recognize the individuals' First Amendment right to engage in
a public dialogue, regardless of the speakers' views.
Second, HUD should look to whom the speech is being directed. If
citizens are merely addressing other neighbors, rather than the proposed resi-
dents themselves, the behavior probably does not rise to the level of direct
intimidation. If citizens are pursuing their complaints through the local gov-
ernment or court systems, then HUD should allow the process of local gov-
ernment to proceed without interference. Investigating individuals who
choose to speak out functions to prevent or deter them from pursuing their
First Amendment rights, in the same manner that SLAPPs discourage oppo-
sition on public policy issues. Once the issue is raised, courts are willing to
protect a defendant's free speech rights in SLAPP actions by shifting the
burden to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's activities are not protect-
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ed by the First Amendment. Similarly, courts should discourage HUD's
investigations that serve to chill citizen protests. Certainly, it should be ille-
gal to threaten or harass the handicapped residents of a group home to pre-
vent them from exercising their fair housing rights. It is another matter for
private residents and community groups to disagree with a government plan
and oppose it by speaking out or petitioning government officials and
courts.
Finally, if citizens raise a zoning challenge to a proposed fair housing
project that HUD views as contrary to the Fair Housing Act and its ideals,
then HUD should attack the zoning ordinance. Investigating individuals who
petition the government on the basis of a local law, regardless of whether
that law will eventually pass constitutional muster, appears to be a case of
attacking the messenger rather then the message. Citizens should not be
deterred from filing an action in court or seeking out an elected official for
fear of repercussions from the federal government. A discriminatory zoning
law or restrictive covenant can be struck down without inquiring into the
motivations of those who seek to enforce it.
All peaceful public protest speech should be protected. Under First
Amendment ideals, people must be free to evaluate ideas without govern-
ment interference. It cannot be left to fair housing advocates, Congress, or
HUD to determine which community and citizen ideas are worthy of dis-
semination. Each individual citizen should decide for themselves which
principles and opinions are worthy of expression, consideration, and accep-
tance. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein." 2
MARY CAROLINE LEE
252 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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